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NOTES AND COMMENTS
OWNERSHIP RIGHTS IN SUBSURFACE
NATURAL GAS STORAGE AREAS
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent shortage of natural gas, and the resultant loss of heat
and power in homes and industrial plants, underscores the need to in-
sure available supplies of natural gas.' To insure supply during periods
of peak consumption, producers of gas have increasingly relied on gas
tapped from subsurface storage areas.2 These efforts have been ham-
pered, however, by the uncertainty surrounding the ownership of un-
derground storage areas.3 In practice, this uncertainty has usually
prompted the users of underground storage areas to purchase under-
1. In January of 1981, shortages of natural gas in Massachusetts caused a statewide energy
emergency and the closing of schools and some businesses. N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1981, at 1, col. 4;
Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 15, 1981, at 1, col. 4. The gas shortages during the winter of 1977
were especially critical. Ten states declared a state of emergency, many schools were closed, and it
was estimated that over 1.6 million workers were idle. NEWSWEEK, Feb. 14, 1977, at 23-24.
2. Underground gas storage provides the most efficient means of balancing relatively
constant pipeline gas supplies with widely fluctuating seasonal, daily, and hourly market
requirements. Gas is injected into storage during off-peak periods when market require-
ments are less than supply availability, and gas is withdrawn from storage when market
demand exceeds available supplies from other sources. Storage reservoirs are usually
replenished during the April through September period and drawn down between Octo-
ber and March.
During 1978, 2,151 billion cubic feet were withdrawn from storage and 2,271 billion
cubic feet were injected. Withdrawals in 1978 were 415 billion cubic feet greater than in
1977.
.The number of underground storage reservoirs in the United States rose to 388 in
1978, an increase of three from 1977. Total storage capacity at the end of 1978 was 7,330
billion cubic feet compared to 7,223 billion cubic feet at the end of 1977.
There were 17,297 active wells in underground storage fields at year-end 1978 as
compared to 16,928 in 1977.
AMERICAN GAS ASS'N, GAS FACTS 45 (1978).
3. The courts that have decided this issue have reached conflicting results. Compare Central
Kentucky Nat. Gas Co. v. Smaliwood, 252 S.W.2d 866, 868 (Ky. 1952) (by implication) (gas stor-
age areas belong to mineral owner) with Ellis v. Louisiana Arkansas Gas Co., 450 F. Supp. 412
(E.D. Okla. 1978), af'd, 609 F.2d 436 (10th Cir. 1979); Emeny v. United States, 412 F.2d 1319 (Ct.
Cl. 1969); Miles v. Home Gas Co., 35 A.D.2d 1042, 316 N.Y.S.2d 908 (1970); Tate v. United Fuel
Gas Co., 137 W. Va. 272, 71 S.E.2d 65 (1952). See generally I E. KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 26 (1964); H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 222 (abr. ed.
1975).
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ground storage rights from both the mineral and surface estate owners4
to insure against the risk of future lawsuits.' The legal uncertainty re-
garding subsurface storage areas not only creates confusion and added
4. In situations where the consent of the mineral and surface owners is not forthcoming,
underground gas storage users have resorted to condemnation proceedings to secure gas storage
rights. See H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 3, § 222, at 49; Errebo, Condemnation of De-
pleted Underground Gas Stratafor Gas Storage Purposes, 20 OKLA. B.A.J. 1186, 1187 (1949);
Comment, Condemnation of Depleted UndergroundReservoirsfor Gas Storage Areas, 15 OHIO ST.
LJ. 199, 199-200 (1954). Several states have statutory provisions for condemnation of under-
ground storage areas. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 34-64-101-07 (1973); KAN. STAT. §§ 55-
1201-07 (Supp. 1979); Mo. ANN. STAT, §§ 393.410-.510 (Vernon Supp. 1980). The corresponding
Oklahoma statute is OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 36.1-.7 (West 1969) which in part provides:
Any natural gaspublic utility may condemn/or its usefor the underground storage of
natural gas any subsurface stratum orformation in any land which the commission shall
havefound to be suitable and in thepublic interestfor the underground storage ofnatural
gas, and in connection therewith may condemn such other interests in property as may be
required adequately to examine, prepare, maintain and operate such underground natural
gas storagefacilities," provided, however, that the right of condemnation of underground
sands, formations and strata, granted hereby, shall be limited as follows:
(a) No sand, formation, or stratum which isproducing or which is capable oproduc-
ing oil in paying quantities, through any known recovery method, shall be subject to appro-
priation hereunder,
(b) No gas bearing sand, formation, or stratum shall be subject to appropriation
hereunder, unless the volumes of native gas originally in place therein shall be shown to
be substantially depleted, and that such sand, formation or stratum has a greater value or
utility as a gas storage reservoir for the purpose of insuring an adequate supply of natu-
ral gas for any particular class or group of consumers of natural gas, or for the conserva-
tion of natural gas, than for the production of the relatively small volumes of native gas
which remain therein, provided that no gas sand, formation or stratum shall be con-
demned under the terms of this Act when the gas therein is being used for the secondary
recovery of oil, unless gas in necessary and required amounts is furnished to the operator
or operators of the secondary recovery operations for as long as oil is produced in paying
quantities in the secondary operations for the recovery of oil at the same cost as that at
which the gas was being produced at the time of condemnation by the operator of the
secondary recovery project or projects.
(c) Only such area of such underground sand, formation or stratum as may rea-
sonably be expected to be penetrated by gas displaced or injected into such underground
gas storage reservoir may be appropriated hereunder.
(d) No rights or interest in existing underground gas reservoirs, being used for the
injection, storage and withdrawal of natural gas, owned or operated by others than the
condemner, shall be subject to appropriation hereunder.
The right of condemnation hereby granted shall be without prejudice to the rights of
the owner of said lands or of other rights or interests therein to drill or bore through the
underground stratum or formation so appropriated in such manner as shall comply with
orders, rules and regulations of the commission issued for the purpose of protecting un-
derground storage strata or formations against pollution and against the escape of natu-
ral gas therefrom and shall be without prejudice to the rights of the owner of said lands
or other rights or interests therein as to all other uses thereof. The additional cost of
complying with such regulations or orders in order to protect the storage shall be paid by
the public utility.
Id. § 35.3 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Condemnation, however, does not solve the prob-
lem of the division of the award between the surface and mineral owners. E. KUNTZ, supra note 3,
§ 2.6, at 73.
5. See E. KUNTz, supra note 3, § 2.6, at 73; H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 3, § 222,
at 49. The purchasing of underground storage rights from both mineral and surface estate owners
is a prudent but expensive practice, which may account for the scarcity of cases in this area.
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expense for gas producers, but impedes the use of underground storage
areas and the maintenance of a stable supply of gas for consumers.
An analysis of the conflicting decisions in this area suggests that
ownership rights in underground storage areas should belong to the
surface estate owner. A prior severance of minerals or an oil and gas
lease6 should not be construed to give the mineral estate or interest
owner7 subsurface gas storage rights in the absence of language ex-
pressly granting such rights.
6. Oil and gas operators have recognized the value of subsurface storage rights. Lowe, Rep-
resenting the Landowner in Oil and Gas Leasing Transactions, 31 OKLA. L. REv. 257, 285 (1978).
Consequently, many operators have begun using lease clauses such as the following:
The Lessor, for and in consideration of the sum of One Dollar ($1.00) in hand paid
by the Lessee, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and of the covenants and
agreements hereinafter contained, does hereby lease and let unto the Lessee for the pur-
pose of drilling, operating for, producing and removing oil and gas and all the constitu-
ents thereof on, from and under the following described lands, andfor thefurtherpurpose
of injecting, storing and holding in storage, and removing gas, including gas lying thereun-
der, bypumping through wells or other means, into, in and/rom any sands, strata orforma-
tions underling said lands, regardless ofthe source ofsuch gas or the location fthe wells
or other means of so doing:
In full compensation for the use of the leased premises for the purposes of injecting,
storing or holding in storage, and removing gas into, in and from any sands, strata or
formations underlying the leased premises Lessee shall pay Lessor each year, quarterly
in advance, (1) a storage rental equivalent to $200.00 for or on account of each well
located on the leased premises and used for such purposes, or (2) if no wells shall be used
on the leased premises for such purposes, a storage rental in the amount equivalent to the
Delay Rental hereinbefore specified. The Lessee at any time may notify the Lessor in
writing at the address of Lessor last known to Lessee, by registered or certified mail, of
the Lessee's intention to use the leased premises, together with any well or wells located
thereon, for any and all of the gas storage purposes hereinbefore specified of injecting,
storing, or holding in storage, and removing gas into, in and from any sands, strata or
formations underlying the leased premises, and upon the giving of such notice the Lessee
may use the leased premises, together with any well or wells located thereon, for any or
all of said gas storage purposes. Payment for storage use shall commence on the date
such use begins, shall continue until the leased premises shall no longer be used for
storage purposes, and shall be in lieu of all delay rentals or royalties for the right to
produce and remove, and the production and removal of, gas from the sands, strata or
formations in which gas is stored by the Lessee. The Lessee shall pay the Lessor for all
damage to growing crops, trees and fences caused by the Lessee's operations under this
lease, said damages, if not mutually agreed upon, to be ascertained and determined by
three disinterested persons, one thereof to be appointed by the Lessor, one by the Lessee,
and the third by the two so appointed, and the award of such three persons shall be final
and conclusive.
ld. at n. 113 (emphasis and omission made by Lowe).
7. Whether a severance of minerals creates a mineral interest or estate depends on the law
of the state in which the severance takes place. If the state adheres to the ownership in place
theory, the mineral owner obtains a present possessory right to the oil and gas in place. His
mineral estate is subject to disfeasance, however, if the oil and gas is drained or migrates. If the
state adheres to the non-ownership theory, the mineral owner receives a non-possessory right to
explore for and produce the oil and gas. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 3, §§ 203.1-.3.
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II. THE SETTING
Ownership problems regarding underground storage areas do not
usually arise until after the fee simple estate is divided into mineral and
surface estates or interests.8 Once the estate is severed, however, the
ownership of underground storage areas becomes uncertain unless the
landowner's intent regarding underground storage rights is expressly
articulated in the conveyance instrument.9 Given this premise, the de-
termination of the ownership of underground storage areas should gen-
erally turn on the intent of the landowner when the mineral estate or
interest is severed.' 0 Consequently, the problem is one of interpreting
the conveyance instrument, especially when the instrument fails to ad-
dress the subsurface storage issue. Professor Kuntz notes: "[b]ecause
the ownership of or the right to use the subsurface area for storage may
be granted or reserved, whether or not the owner of a granted or re-
served mineral estate has such a right is properly a problem of con-
struction of instruments."" The cases holding that underground
storage areas belong to the surface estate owner have generally fol-
lowed Kuntz's reasoning.' 2
In marked contrast, the case holding that underground storage ar-
eas belong to the mineral estate owner bases its decision upon the
premise that stored gas is analogous to wild animals13 or animalferae
8. If the fee owner owns both the surface and mineral estate, there is no question regarding
his right to convey gas storage rights. See H. WILLIAMS AND C. MEYERS, supra note 3, § 222, at
49; McGinnis, Some Legal Problems in Underground Gas Storage, 17TH ANN. INST. ON OIL AND
TAX., 23, 42 (1966); Stamm, Legal Problems in Underground Storage of Natural Gas, 36 TEX. L.
REV. 161, 165 (1957).
9. The legal uncertainty in this area is reflected by case law and treatises in the field. Profes-
sors Williams and Meyers argue that a "mineral severance should be construed as granting exclu-
sive rights to subterranean strata for all purposes relating to minerals, whether 'native' or
'injected,' absent contrary language in the instrument severing such minerals." H. WILLIAMS & C.
MEYERS, supra note 3, § 222; accord, Stamm, supra note 8, at 171-72; Comment, The Underground
Natural Gas Shortage and Conservation Act of 1977: A ThresholdIssue, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 1065,
1074-75 (1977). Contra, McGinnis, supra note 8; see Scott, Underground Storage of Natural Gas:
A Study of Legal Problems, 19 OKLA. L. REv. 47 (1966); Comment, Subsurface Storage of Gas, 39
Miss. L.J. 81 (1967).
10. See Ellis v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 450 F. Supp. 412, 420 (E.D.Okla. 1978), aft'd,
609 F.2d 436 (10th Cir. 1979); McGinnis, supra note 8, at 47-51. This position is the logical exten-
sion of the rule that the fee owner owns the land to an indefinite extent upward and downward.
The landowner would be deemed to have retained everything not conveyed. 450 F. Supp. at 421.
11. E. KUNTZ, supra note 3, § 2.6, at 73.
12. See notes 58, 65, 69, & 72 infra and accompanying text.
13. The courts' recognition of the fugacious nature of oil and gas led to the adoption of the
wild animal or animalferae naturae analogy. At common law, courts analogized the landowner's
interest in oil and gas to wild animals. The landowner's title vested only if the oil and gas, like a
wild animal, was brought under his dominion and control. See R. HEMMINGWAY, THE LAW OF
OIL AND GAS, 10-12 (1971); W. SUMMERS, 1 THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 11, at 20-22 (1954).
1981]
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naturae.14 Once the gas is injected into the ground it returns to its nat-
ural state, similar to a wild animal, and either becomes part of the min-
eral estate or becomes subject to a mineral owner's exclusive right to
explore and produce the oil and gas.1
5
III. THE FERAE NATJuiAE THEORY
The decision that most significantly advanced the application of
theferae naturae theory to ownership of underground storage areas is
Hammonds v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. I6 In Hammonds, the
plaintiff, owner of a fee estate within the defendant's property, sued the
defendant gas company which was engaged in underground storage ac-
tivities, for trespass.' 7 The plaintiff claimed that the defendant injected
gas into her estate without her permission. From a judgment for the
defendant, the plaintiff appealed and the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
affirmed the lower court finding that the company lost the title to its gas
when it injected the gas into the underground reservoir.18 Because the
company lost its ownership rights in the gas, it could not be held liable
for trespass. The court reasoned that the injection of gas into the un-
derground storage area returned it, like a wild animal, to its natural
state. '9 "If one capture a fox in a forest and turn it loose in another, or
if he catch a fish and put it in the stream at another point, has he not
done with that migratory common property what the defendant has
done with the gas in this case?"2
The much criticized Hammonds approach2' gives rise to poten-
The animalferae naturae analogy, however, has been subject to severe criticism. See note 21
infra.
14. See note 33 infra and accompanying text.
15. If the state adheres to the ownership in place theory, the injected gas would become part
of the mineral estate; if, the state adheres to the non-ownership in place theory, the injected gas
would be subjected to the mineral owner's exclusive right to explore and produce the oil and gas,
See note 7 supra.
16. 255 Ky. 685, 75 S.W.2d 204 (1934).
17. Had the defendant retained title to the injected gas then it would appear that a technical
trespass was committed since "[olne may commit a trespass upon the vertical surface of another's
premises, as well as the horizontal. . . .[because] the landowners interest in exclusive possession
is not limited to the surfaces; it extends above and below." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS, § 13 at 69 (4th ed. 1971).
18. 255 Ky. 685, -, 75 S.W.2d 204, 206 (1934).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. E.g., Stamm, supra note 8, at 166. Accord 48 HARv. L. REv. 855 (1935); 19 MINN. L.
REv. 483 (1935); 13 TEx. L. REv. 378 (1935). Summers, in his treatise states:
All of these analogies of oil and gas to solid minerals, to subterranean waters, and to
animalsferae naturae are false, for the reason that the physical and economical facts of
oil and gas from which the legal relations of the landowner respecting them are actually
[Vol. 16:470
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tially awkward results. The decision appeared to enable persons in sit-
uations similar to the plaintiffs to produce gas stored underneath their
land as though it were their own.22 Consequently, the gas storage user
must obtain storage rights from all mineral estate or interest owners
over the reservoir, regardless of whether oil or gas are present, to insure
himself against the prospect of production of stored gas by such own-
ers. The necessity of acquiring such rights not only greatly increases
the cost of storing gas, but introduces an element of risk since the own-
ership of land may be found to lie with someone other than the person
from whom the gas storage user received the right to store.23
The Hammonds decision also conflicts with the notion that oil and
gas, once extracted, assume the status of personal property.24 Nor-
mally, to lose title to personal property, it is necessary to show an intent
to abandon. Abandonment requires a permanent intent to give up
dominion and control.2 6 Clearly, the defendant did not manifest a per-
manent intent to abandon by storing gas in the underground storage
area.27 In holding that title to gas is lost upon injection the court re-
determined, are different from the physical and economic facts of the substances with
which they are compared.
W. SUMMERS, supra note 13, § 62 at 173.
22. One commentator notes:
The decision was against the plaintiff; but she might well have congratulated herself
because she had won more than she lost. For now, she might return to her close, sink
wells, and draw off as much as she could of the gas which the company had stored in the
stratum, and all that she drew off would be her sole property since she had again reduced
the wild mineral to possession.
Note, The Ownership of Natural Gas and Some Real Property Concepts, 36 VA. L. REV. 947, 947
(1950) (footnote omitted).
23. See 13 TEx. L. REv. 378, 378 (1935).
24. E.g., State v. Alabama Gas Corp., 258 Ala. 356, -, 62 So. 2d 454, 457 (1952) (appliances
in question use gas, which is personal property and thus fall within the tax exemption provided for
machine used in processing of tangible personal property); Carpenter v. Shaw, 134 Okla. 29, 33,
272 P. 393, 398 (1928) (oil once extracted becomes personal property and is subject to tax); Chaffin
v. Hall, 210 S.W.2d 191, 194 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948, writ ref. n.r.e) (royalty owner can not compel a
partition of land because he holds a contingent interest in the oil and gas which becomes personal
property upon production). See generally E. KUNTZ, supra note 3, § 2.5, at 68; H. WILLIAMS & C.
MEYERS, supra note 3, § 212 at 23.
25. See Crosson v. Lion Oil & Ref. Co., 169 Ark. 561,-, 275 S.W. 899, 900-01 (1925) (title to
oil which escaped due to break in pipeline was not lost because there was no intent to abandon);
Standard Oil Co. of La. v. Kinnebrew, 155 La. 1009, -, 99 So. 802, 803 (1924) (party's actions did
not indicate an intent to abandon and therefore title to the escaped oil was not lost). See generally
R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 1.6 (1975).
26. See Crosson v. Lion Oil and Ref. Co., 169 Ark. 561,-, 275 S.W. 899, 900-01 (1925); Hoff
v. Girdler Corp., 104 Colo. 56, -, 88 P.2d 100, 102-03 (1939) (temporary failure to market gas did
not show an intent to abandon the lease). "Abandonment occurs when there is 'a giving up, a
total desertion, and absolute relinquishment' of private goods by the former owner." R. BROWN,
supra note 25, § 1.6 (emphasis added).
27. See 41 W. VA. L.Q. 431, 432 (1935).
19811
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jected the traditional personal property classification as to the gas.
Conversely, the court claimed that "when gas is thus severed and
brought under dominion and actual possession at the surface, it, of
course, becomes the personal property of the one who has extracted it
under a right to do so."28 The inconsistency in the court's opinion is
evident.
The rule in Hammonds that causes the injector to lose title to the
injected gas29 has been rejected in some states.3 ° Other states have
adopted statutory provisions that enable the injector to retain title to
the injected gas.3' Nevertheless, Hammonds remains significant be-
cause it serves, at least in Kentucky, 32 as the basis for finding that un-
derground gas storage areas belong to the mineral owner.
The case of Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. v. Smallwood 3 con-
cerned a gas company which had obtained an oil and gas storage lease
to a tract of land from the surface estate owner who also owned an
undivided one half interest in the mineral estate. After using the land
for gas storage purposes, the company divided the rentals between the
plaintiff and the other one half mineral estate owner.34 The plaintiff
28. 255 Ky. 685, -, 75 S.W.2d 204, 206 (1934).
29. Id.
30. The holding of Hammonds has been rejected in Pennsylvania and Texas. In White v.
New York State Nat. Gas Corp., 190 F. Supp. 342 (W.D. Pa. 1960), the court held that title to
natural gas, which has been reduced to possession, is not lost by injection into underground reser-
voirs for storage purposes. Id. at 349. The court rejected the wild animal analogy and under-
scored the differences between the physical characteristics ofstored gas and native gas. Id. at 348.
The same conclusion was reached by a Texas court in Lone Star Gas Co. v. Murchison, 353
S.W.2d 870, 879 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962, writ ref n.r.e). The court concluded that the injection of
gas in underground storage areas did not constitute an abandonment of gas because there was no
intent to abandon. Id. The court then rejected Hammonds noting that "[g]as has no similarities to
wild animals. Gas is an inanimate, diminishing non-reproductive substance lacking any will of its
own, and instead of running wild and roaming at large as animals do, is subject to be moved
solely by pressure or mechanical means." Id.
31. See, COLO. REv. STAT. § 34-64-107 (1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 393.500 (Vernon Supp.
1980). The corresponding Oklahoma statute provides:
,411 natural gas which has previously been reduced to possession, and which is subse-
quently injected into underground storage fields, sands, reservoirs andfacities, shall at all
times be deemed the property of the injector, his heirs, successors or assigns; and in no
event shall such gas be subject to the right of the owner of the surface of said lands or of
any mineral interest therein, under which said gas storage fields, sands, reservoirs, and
facilities lie, or of any person other than the injector, his heirs, successors and assigns, to
produce, take, reduce to possession, waste, or otherwise interfere with or exercise any
control thereover, provided that the injector, his heirs, successors and assigns, shall have
no right to gas in any stratum, or portion thereof, which has not been condemned under
the provisions of this Act, or otherwise purchased.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 36.6 (West 1969) (emphasis added).
32. See note 33 infra and accompanying text.
33. 252 S.W.2d 866 (Ky. 1952).
34. Id. at 866-67.
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sued the defendant gas company claiming that he, as the surface estate
owner, was entitled to all of the rentals. The court held for the defend-
ant, reasoning that since gas, like a wild animal, returns to its natural
state upon injection, "the mineral owner would have the exclusive right
to explore for and produce gas released for storage as well as native
gas."35 Although the court stated that it was not "necessary to decide
whether the cavity or stratum from which a mineral has been removed
becomes the property of the mineral or surface estate owner,"36 it in
effect decided this question by holding that rentals should go to the
mineral estate owner.37
This case shares the shortcoming of Hammonds because it is simi-
larly based on theferae naturae theory. There are additional problems
with this rationale though. If theferae naturae reasoning is carried to
its logical conclusion, the user of the storage area should make royalty
payments to royalty owners on the stored gas when it is removed. If the
ownership of gas is lost upon injection, and the gas returns to its natu-
ral state, it follows that a percentage of stored gas production, free of
cost, goes to the royalty owner.38 This implication, however, was re-
jected by the Texas Supreme Court in Humble Oil and Refining Co. v.
West.39 In Humble, the defendant fee owner, after producing eighty
nine percent of the native gas, engaged in underground storage activi-
ties. The plaintiff-royalty interest owner sought to enjoin the defendant
from storing gas and alternatively sought royalty payments on both the
native and stored gas. The court decided plaintiff's first contention by
balancing the plaintiffs interest in receiving royalties on the remaining
native gas against defendant's interest in using the underground gas
storage area.40 Stressing the value of the stored gas to the nearby com-
munity and the fact that the depletion of native gas would destroy the
reservoirs usefulness as a storage area, the court denied plaintiff's re-
35. Id. The court cited Hammonds with approval stating "under the analogy recognized in
[Hammonds] it is apparent that there is no distinction in the title to gas once recovered and re-
leased for subterranean storage and native gas before its initial recovery." Id. at 867-88.
36. Id.
37. See Donely, Use of the Containing Space After the Removal of Subsurface Minerals, 55 W.
VA. L. REv. 202, 212 (1953).
38. The royalty owner is "entitled to a share in such minerals as are severed, or the proceeds
thereof." H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 3, § 202.3. See E. KUNTZ, supra note 3, § 3.91.
39. 508 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1974), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977). See generally Note, Hum-
ble Oil & Refining Co. v. West: The Underground Storage of Natural Gas Causes Confusion, 27
BAYLOR L. REv. 806 (1975)..
40. 508 S.W.2d at 816.
1981]
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quest for an injunction."
The court also rejected the plaintiff's second contention that the
conveyance instrument which entitled him to "certain royalties on oil
and gas and other minerals which may be produced and saved from the
lands hereby conveyed" included royalties on both the native and
stored gas.42 The court reasoned that the conveyance did not entitle the
plaintiff to royalties on the stored gas because the stored gas "having
assumed the character of personal property remained [defendant's]
property" upon injection.43 A contrary result, the court stated "would
implicitly recognize the doctrine of mineralsferae naturae.' 4
The plaintiff also argued that the defendant's injection of gas con-
fused the native and non-native gas and resulted in the forfeiture of
defendant's rights in the non-native gas. The court noted that the de-
fendant was responsible for commingling the native and non-native gas
and held that the defendant had the burden of determining the amount
of the remaining native gas on which the plaintiff would receive royal-
ties with reasonable certainty.45 Thus, the court rejected the wild
animal theory espoused in Hammonds.
Another necessary implication of theferae naturae theory relates
to its effect on the extension of the lease beyond the primary term.4 6 If
there is no difference between native and stored gas, then the later re-
moval of stored gas should keep an oil and gas lease in force beyond
the primary term. The court in Smallwood v. Central Kentucky Natural
Gas Co.47 addressed the issue of extending the lease beyond the pri-
41. Absent injection of extraneous gas, production of native gas to depletion will result
in a watering out or total destruction of the storage capability of the reservoir. As a
consequence, injunction against the injection of extraneous gas would render illusory
Humble's ownership of the storage rights in the reservoir.
Moreover, our ruling will determine the continued existence of an important natural
resource. The record reveals two significant features of the reservoir which vitally affect
the public interest. First, the reservoir is well-suited as a "peaking" facility which can
handle the seasonal fluctuations and rapidly increasing energy demands for the greater
Houston area; secondly, it is a strategically located "emergency" facility, capable of pro-
viding a readily deliverable supply of gas at times when accidents, natural disasters or
mechanical failures make continued delivery through normal channels impossible.
Id.
42. Id. at 817.
43. The court cited the Murchison and White cases, supra note 30, with approval. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 819.
46. The typical oil and gas lease provides the lessee with a term ofyears, or a primary term,
during which the lessee must either pay delay rentals or produce oil and gas. To keep the oil and
gas lease in force, beyond the primary term, the lessee must produce oil and gas. H. WILLIAMS &
C. MEYERS, supra note 3, § 603.
47. 308 S.W.2d 439 (Ky. 1957).
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mary term due to subsequent removal of stored gas. In Smallwood, the
plaintiff-lessor sued the defendant-lessee alleging that defendant's lease
had expired because there had been no production beyond the primary
term. The defendant maintained that his production of non-native
stored gas had maintained the lease. The defendant cited both the
Hammonds and Central cases, arguing that since injected gas returns to
its natural state, there should be no distinction between native gas, and
gas allocated for storage.4" The court rejected its earlier reasoning and
held that natural gas produced elsewhere, and stored in gas wells on the
leased premises, was not gas "produced from" the leased premises
when it was subsequently removed.49 Since there was no production
beyond the primary term under the provisions of the lease, the lease
expired.
Smallwood was a marked departure from the Hammonds and Cen-
tral cases because the court avoided theferae naturae theory. Instead,
the focus was on the parties' intent as evidenced in the conveyance in-
strument. In essence, the court stated that the parties did not intend for
the term "production" to include the removal of stored gas.
The inherent weakness of theferae naturae theory as a device to
safeguard the storage users rights is that title to gas is lost by the under-
ground storage user. The loss of title by the storage user not only dis-
courages the use of underground storage but affects other
considerations such as the need for royalty payments on the stored
gas,5" and the extension of the lease beyond the primary term upon
removal of the stored gas.5 ' Furthermore, theferae naturae rationale
does not address the potential problem of interference with the land-
owner's surface estate which subsurface gas storage activities may en-
tail.
IV. INTERPRETING THE CONVEYANCE INSTRUMENT
The cases holding that underground storage areas belong to the
surface estate owner have focused on the intent of the parties when the
mineral estate was severed or when the oil and gas lease was con-
48. Id. at 442.
49. Id. at 443. See W. SUMMERS, supra note 13, § 295. "Ordinarily, to extend a lease beyond
the fixed term by production, the oil or gas must be produced from the demised land." Id. (foot-
note omitted).
50. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
51. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
1981]
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veyed .5  The problem faced by courts in these cases is construing con-
veyance instruments which fail to address gas storage rights. Various
rules of construction may apply to ascertaining the intention of the con-
veying parties. 3 Courts may focus on the particular words used in the
instruments. 4 If the words are plain and unambiguous, they may be
given their literal meaning.55 If the words are unclear, they may be
interpreted in light of the other parts of the instrument.56 Perhaps the
most important interpretative guide is provided when consideration is
given to the purpose the instrument is intended to serve.57
In Tate v. UnitedFuel Gas Co ., the defendant conveyed a tract of
land to the plaintiff, excepting and reserving "oil, gas and brine and all
minerals. . . with the exclusive right to drill and mine thereon for the
production and removal of the oil and gas and other minerals hereby
excepted."59 Based on this reservation of mineral rights, the defendant
conveyed gas storage rights to a third party. The plaintiff, surface own-
er, sued seeking a cancellation of the gas storage agreement, alleging
that there was no recoverable oil and gas in the storage area. The plain
meaning rule was used by the court to ascertain the intent of the con-
veying parties.60  The court interpreted the reservation as including
rights for the purpose of mining and operating the land for the produc-
tion of minerals, but not rights relating to the storage of gas produced
off the premises."
52. See notes 58, 65, 69, & 72 infra and accompanying text.
53. See 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 12.89-.92 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); E. KUNTZsupra
note 3, § 16.1.
54. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.89, at 380 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); See Gibson v.
Watson, 315 S.W.2d 48, 56 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958 writ ref. n.r.e.) (each deed must be construed
from language used in the deed).
55. It has been stated that "where the meaning is plain as expressed in the instrument there is
no room for construction." 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 54, § 12.89, at 381. See,
e.g., Wallace v. Bellamy, 199 N.C. 759, -, 155 S.E. 856, 859 (1930) (when the parties intention is
clear, the court will not resort to construction); Halbert v. Green, 156 Tex. 223, -, 293 S.W.2d
848, 852-53 (1956) (language of unambiguous instrument controls regardless of construction given
the instrument by the parties).
56. In oil and gas transactions this approach is referred to as the "four corners" rule. See E.
KUNTZ, supra note 3, at § 16.1. "Under the four corners rule, the court makes every effort to
reconcile all provisions of the entire instrument and to arrive at the intention of the parties as
deduced from all the language contained in the instrument." Id.
57. See, e.g., Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. West, 374 I11. 514, -, 30 N.E.2d 24, 26 (1940)
(dissenting opinion) (court will consider the objects to be attained); Drucker v. Russel, 279 Pa.
443, -, 124 A. 92, 93 (1924) (intent of parties should be considered).
58. 137 W. Va. 272, 71 S.E.2d 65 (1952).
59. Id. at -, 71 S.E.2d at 65.
60. Id. at -, 71 S.E.2d at 67.
61. The court also emphasized the fact that the exception of minerals did not include clay,
sand, or stone. Id. at -, 71 S.E.2d at 69.
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The Tate decision is consistent with the primary purpose behind
the conveyance of an oil and gas lease, the extraction of native miner-
als.62 When the landowner conveys an oil and gas lease, he usually
expects the lessee to explore for and produce the oil and gas in place.
The lessors expectation is the receipt of royalty payments. 63 To inter-
pret a conveyance of mineral rights to include a grant of storage rights
is an unwarranted extension of the rights traditionally granted by an oil
and gas lease and inconsistent with the landowner's expectations.64
In 1969, the rationale of the Tate case was used by the Court of
Claims in Emeny v. United States65 to find that underground storage
rights were not conveyed by an oil and gas lease.66 Here, landowners
sued the United States, which was engaged in gas storage activities pur-
suant to leases acquired by means of a condemnation suit. The govern-
ment's oil and gas leases stated that the grant was for "the sole and only
purpose of mining and operating for oil and gas and of laying pipe
lines and of building tanks, power stations and structures thereon, to
produce, save and take care of said products." 67
On the basis of this language, the Court of Claims held for the
landowners and interpreted the intent of the parties as granting "rights
pertaining only to 'mining and operating for oil and gas' on the leased
premises and taking the other steps necessary 'to produce, save and
take care of said products, ie., the oil and gas produced from the leased
premises.' .61
Similarly, in Miles v. Home Gas Co. 69 a New York court held that
a quit claim deed conveying "all the oil, gas and minerals in said prem-
ises, together with the right at all times to enter upon said premises and
to bore wells, make excavations, lay pipes and remove all oil, gas and
62. See H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 3, § 601. "The outstanding purpose behind
any grant of minerals or mineral rights is that the minerals which lie beneath the surface be
released from their underground keepers and brought to the surface where they can be utilized by
man." 21 U. KAN. Crry L. REv. 217, 221 (1953).
63. "The landowner has been interested primarily in obtaining royalties from the lease and
therefore has pressed for immediate exploration and development operations." H. WILLIAMS &
C. MEYERS, supra note 3, § 601.
64. See Lowe, Representing the Landowner in Oil and Gas Leasing Transactions, 31 OKLA. L.
REv. 257, 287 (1978); McGinnis, supra note 8, at 42-52.
65. 412 F.2d 1319 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
66. Id. at 1325.
67. Id. at 1323.
68. Id. "There is no reasonable basis on which the rights granted to the lessee. . . could be
construed gas including the right to bring to the premises and store there gas produced elsewhere."
Id.
69. 35 A.D.2d 1042, 316 N.Y.S.2d 908 (1970).
1981]
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minerals found thereon" did not convey gas storage rights.70 The court
distinguished the rights relating to the extraction of gas with the rights
relating to the storage of non-native gas and held that the wording was
clear and unambiguous in conveying rights solely relating to the pro-
duction of native gas.7 1
A similar interpretation was given to an oil and gas lease in Ellis v.
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. 72 In Ellis, the surface estate owner sued
the defendant gas company to recover damages for the unauthorized
use of underground storage areas. While the case was ultimately de-
cided in favor of the defendant upon a finding that the company had
acquired gas storage rights by prescription,73 the federal court, never-
theless, held that suface estate owners, 74 rather than the owners of min-
eral interests, had the right to convey gas storage rights. 75 The intent of
the parties was determined by looking at the plain meaning of the min-
eral severance instruments which gave "the mineral interest owner all
of the oil, gas and other minerals 'that may be produced'; this included
70. Id. at-, 316 N.Y.S.2d at 910.
71. Id. at-, 316 N.Y.S.2d at 910.
72.. 450 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Okla. 1978), af'd, 609 F.2d 436 (10th Cir. 1979).
73. 450 F. Supp. at 425.
74. Under the mandate of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), and its progeny, the
federal court was obligated to follow Oklahoma law. The Ellis court, while acknowledging that
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma had not decided the question of the ownership of underground
gas storage areas, found some support for its holding in the case of Sunray Oil Co. v. Cortez Oil
Co., 188 Okla. 690, 112 P.2d 792 (1941). In Cortez, the plaintiff owned one-fourth of the mineral
interest in the land. A dry well had been drilled on the land by a lessee. The defendant, wanting
to use the dry well to dispose of salt water from other oil and gas wells, secured an assignment of
the lease from the lessee and also secured from the landowner, who owned part of the minerals,
the right to use the well as a salt water disposal well. The plaintiff sued to enjoin the defendant
from using the well for salt water disposal purposes, arguing that salt water disposal activities
could impair her mineral interest. The Oklahoma Supreme Court denied the injunction, finding
that the plaintiff's interest was merely speculative, since it was improbable that any produceable
oil and gas was in the land. 188 Okla. 690,-, 112 P.2d 794-95. The Cortez court then stated that
the surface owner "has the right to so use the surface and substrata of her land as she sees fit, or
permit others so to do, so long as such use does not injure or damage other persons." Id. at -,
112 P.2d at 795 (emphasis added). This language appears to support the view that gas storage
areas belong to the surface estate owner. See McGinnis, supra note 8, at 51. The federal court in
Ellis also distinguished the Oklahoma case of West Edmond Salt Water Disposal Ass'n v. Rose-
crans, 204 Okla. 9, 226 P.2d 965 (1950). In West Edmond, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant,
by injecting salt water into an abandoned well on adjoining property, trespassed onto her prop-
erty. The court rejected plaintiffs contention and endorsed Hammonds reasoning that since the
defendant lost title to the injected salt water upon injection, he could not be held liable for tres-
pass. 204 Okla. -, 226 P.2d at 970-71. The court also noted that the reservoir under the injection
well was undefined and that the injected salt water commingled with the salt water underneath
plaintiff's property, without injury to the plaintiff. Id. at -, 226 P.2d at 968, 973. The court in
Ellis distinquished West Edmond by noting that in Ellis the reservoir was well defined and that
there was no commingling between economically producible native gas and the injected gas. For
a discussion in Ellis, of the West Edmond and Cortez decisions, see 450 F. Supp. 412, 418-22,
75. 450 F. Supp. at 422.
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the 'right of ingress and egress at all times for the purpose of mining,
drilling and exploring said lands.' "76 The court found this language to
"denote exploration, production and development. . [not] injection,
storage or occupation."77
As evidenced above, courts generally rely on the plain meaning
rule of construction in reaching their decisions although many other
bases could also have been used to reach the same conclusion. 78 Kuntz'
"theory of enjoyment" supports the conclusion that underground stor-
age areas belong to the surface estate owner.79 This theory determines
the general intention of the parties from the standpoint of enjoyment of
the respective interests created. Professor Kuntz states:
The intention sought should be the general intent rather than
any supposed but unexpressed specific intent, and further,
that the general intent should be arrived at, not by defining
and redefining the terms used, but by considering thepurposes
of the grant or reservation in terms of manners of enjoyment
intended in the insuing interests.80
The purpose of an oil and gas lease or grant of minerals is to con-
76. Id. at 420.
77. Id.
78. One such basis noted in Ellis was the cases in the hard mineral area which have generally
found the cavity left in the land after the minerals are removed, to belong to the surface estate
owner. 1d. at 412. See, e.g., Westerman v. Pennsylvania Salt Mfg. Co., 260 Pa. 140, -, 103 A.
539, 541 (1918)(mineral owners right to use space occupied by minerals ends when the minerals
are extracted); Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 152 Pa. 286, -, 25 A. 597, 599 (1893) (concur-
ring opinion) (the space occupied by the minerals reverts to the mineral owner once the minerals
are removed). See generally 54 Ahi. JUR. 2d Mines and Minerals § 214 (1971); 58 C.J.S. Mines and
Minerals § 162, at 338 (1948).
79. Professor Kuntz's theory of enjoyment has generally been used to determine whether a
particular mineral falls within a general grant of minerals. There is no reason why Kuntz's theory
cannot be applied to the instant situation. This theory determines the parties general intent by
examining the purpose of the grant in light of the mode or manner of enjoyment of a particular
interest.
The difficulty inherent in determining whether or not oil or gas or any other sub-
stance is included within the terms of a grant or reservation of 'minerals' lies in the
traditional approach of attempting to find and give effect to an intention to include or to
exclude specific substances, when, as a matter of fact, the parties had nothing specific in
mind on the matter at all. It is submitted that the intention sought should be the general
intention from the standpoint of enjoyment of the respective interests created. When a
general grant or reservation is made of all minerals without qualifying language, it
should be apparent that the parties intended to sever the entire mineral estate from the
surface estate, leaving the respective owners of each estate with an estate which is enjoy-
able in a special manner. The manner of enjoyment ofthe mineral estate is through extrac-
tion and removal of substances from the earth, whereas the enjoyment of the surface is
through retention of such substances as are necessaryfor the use of the surface, and these
respective modes of enjoyment should be taken in account in arriving at the proper sub-
ject matter of each estate.
E. KUNTZ, supra note 3, § 13.3 (emphasis added).
80. E. Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 Wyo. L.J. 107, 112 (1949).
14
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 16 [1980], Iss. 3, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol16/iss3/4
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
vey rights related to the exploration, development, and production of
oil, gas, and minerals."' The enjoyment of these rights in connection
with gas produced on the leased premises is not related to the under-
ground storage of gas. Underground storage areas are used for the
storage of non-native gas. Accordingly, since underground storage
rights are not related to the enjoyment of the mineral estate or interest,
a rule that underground storage rights belong to the surface estate own-
er would be consistent with the general intent of enjoyment of the min-
eral estate or interest. Furthermore, the use of underground storage
areas entails the use of the surface estate 2 above what is reasonably
necessary for the enjoyment of the mineral estate.8 3 Since underground
storage activities interfere with the enjoyment of the surface estate, it is
unlikely that the grantor intended to convey gas storage rights.84 This
idea is illustrated by the case of Carson v. Missouri Paciftc Railway 5
where the court found that bauxite was not included within a reserva-
tion of mineral rights because the mining of bauxite would entail an
excess burden on the surface estate.8 6 The use of the surface estate for
underground storage, like the use of the surface for the mining of baux-
ite interferes with the enjoyment of the surface estate. This interference
conflicts with the general intent of the enjoyment of the surface estate.
Although Professors Williams and Meyers argue that a mineral sever-
ance should be construed to give the mineral estate owner subsurface
storage rights,8 7 they, nevertheless write:
[The surface owner] should be compensated if there is to be
any use of the surface, whether for production of injection
81. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
82. Before an area can be used for underground gas storage new wells may have to be drilled.
In addition, some abandoned wells may have to be redrilled and then replugged if they are not
used for gas injection and withdrawal purposes. Once the wells are conditioned, a compressor
unit, trunk lines, derhydration plant, and meter stations are used in the injection and withdrawal
operations. 10 INTERSTATE COMPACT Q. BULL. 37, 38 (Dec. 1951).
83. When the mineral estate is severed or when a mineral estate is conveyed, an easement for
reasonable use of the surface is implied in law. Underground storage activities, often time, in-
volve the use of the surface beyond what is reasonbly necessary for the enjoyment of the mineral
estate. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 3, § 222.
84. Cf. McGinnis, supra note 8, at 51 (the right to use the surface in connection with storage
should not be implied in the absence of clear evidence of intent to grant such rights),
85. 212 Ark. 963, 209 S.W.2d 97 (1948) (dictum); see Holland v. Dolese Co., 540 P.2d 549,
552-53 (Okla. 1975) (limestone not included within a reservation of mineral rights because the
quarry operation related to the extraction of limestone destroyed the surface for its normal use);
Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 351-52 (Tex. 971) (iron ore was not included within a convey-
ance of minerals because the mining of iron would interfere with the usual uses of thd surface
estate).
86. 212 Ark. -, 209 S.W.2d at 99.
87. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 3, § 222.
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wells or for any other purpose since the severance of minerals
should not be construed as authorizing the mineral owner
without consent of the surface owner to use the surface for
purposes other than exploration, development and production
of native minerals.88
The only complications with the finding that underground storage
rights belong to the surface estate owner occur in situations where gas
storage begins before a reservoir is totally depleted89 and situations
where a depleted cavity is refilled with migrating gas.90 These situa-
tions should not present insurmountable obstacles, however, since it is
possible to estimate the volume of any remaining gas9 and since the
gas storage user will be aware of the amount of gas that has been
stored. In the former situation the mineral owner should be compen-
sated for the minerals remaining in the cavity.92 In the latter situation,
if, during the removal of gas, more gas is extracted than was stored, the
gas storage user would compensate the parties who have an interest in
the mineral estate.
V. CONCLUSION
Given the public interest in insuring available supplies of natural
gas, it is imperative that the suppliers of gas be encouraged to use un-
derground storage areas.93 It is difficult to see how a rule that owner-
ship rights in subsurface gas storage areas belong to the mineral estate
owners can encourage the use of underground gas storage areas. The
ferae naturae theory was adopted by the courts in recognition of the
fugacious nature of oil and gas.94 The analogy between wild animals
and oil and gas is imperfect, however, because oil and gas are not the
88. Id.
89. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
90. See Donely, Use of the Containing Space After the Removal of Subsurface Minerals, 55 W.
VA. L. REv. 202, 212-13 (1953).
91. In Exxon Corp. v. West, 543 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977), the
oil company met its burden of showing to a reasonable certainty, the maximum total volume of
gas remaining in the reservoir at the time gas storage activities were begun by presenting expert
testimony. 543 S.W.2d at 673. The royalty owners interest would be calculated based on this
estimated volume. Id. at 674.
92. The mineral owner's compensation, similar to the royalty owner's compensation, would
be calculated by subtracting the amount of gas produced from the amount of gas originally in the
reservoir to get the amount of gas remaining in the reservoir. Id. at 670.
93. See note I supra and accompanying text; the public interest in encouraging underground
gas storage areas is reflected in the adoption of underground gas storage area condemnation stat-
utes. See note 4 supra.
94. See note 13 supra.
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property of the public.95 The right to extract and develop the oil and
gas is limited to the mineral estate or interest owners. 96 Furthermore,
theferae naturae theory, with its resultant loss of title to the injected
gas, is contrary to the objective of insuring a stable supply of gas be-
cause it discourages the use of underground storage areas.97 This the-
ory also conflicts with the personal property classification given
extracted oil and gas because it results in loss of title without an intent
to abandon the injected gas.98 Additionally, this theory gives rise to
problematic implications such as the need for royalty payments on the
stored gas99 and the extension of the lease beyond the primary term
upon the later removal of stored gas. °° Most significantly, such a hold-
ing requires the gas supplier not only to purchase gas storage rights
from the mineral owners but also to obtain the necessary surface rights
from the surface estate owners.'' Obtaining all the necessary rights
would be costly and very burdensome because mineral estates are com-
monly fractionalized into a multitude of interests.'0 2 Therefore, sub-
surface gas storage users would have to contact, negotiate, and contract
with the many mineral interest owners.
A finding that subsurface gas storage areas belong exclusively to
the surface estate owners would facilitate the use of underground stor-
age areas because the suppliers of gas could obtain all the necessary
storage rights from the surface estate owners.' 0 3 Obtaining the neces-
sary storage rights would be more expedient and less expensive since
gas storage users would have to contract with fewer parties."°4 More-
over, such a holding would be consistent with the general intent of the
parties when the mineral estate or interest was created since gas storage
rights are not related to the enjoyment of the mineral estate'0 5 and do
95. See 19 MINN. L. REv. 483, 484 (1935).
96. See note 7 supra.
97. In support of its holding that the title to gas is not lost upon injection, the court in While v
New York State Nat. Gas. Corp. examined the public interest in encouraging the use of subsurface
storage areas. 190 F. Supp. 342, 349 (W.D. Pa. 1960).
98. See notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text.
99. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
100. See note 40 supra and acompanying text.
101. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
102. See note 72 supra at 422. The conveyance of fractional mineral interests has caused ahost of construction problems. See E. KUNTZ, supra note 3, § 16.3.
103. See McGinnis, supra note 8. "Construing a mineral deed to preclude storage rights un-
less a contrary intent is shown would also reconcile the treatment of surface easements for storage
with the result advocated as to the ownership of the storage space." Id. at 8.
104. Except in urban areas, the surface estate is generally owned by fewer parties. See note 72
supra note at 422. The surface owner, who lives on the land could be easily located.
105. See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
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interfere with the enjoyment of the surface estate. °6 Finally, such a
holding does not compromise the mineral owner's interest in the native
gas. The gas storage user would compensate the mineral owner for any
gas remaining in the cavity. 107 Likewise, the mineral owners would be
compensated if any gas migrated into the depleted cavity.
The problems that arise in connection with the underground stor-
age of gas stem from the failure of the original grantors to articulate
their intent regarding these rights. This failure has forced the courts to
determine the grantor's unexpressed intent. The preceding cases indi-
cate that this intent may best be effectuated if the animalferae naturae
analogy is avoided, and subsurface gas storage rights are deemed to
belong to the surface estate owner.
Ali M.M. Mojdehi
106. See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
107. See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
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